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Abstract 
This paper analyses the liquidity effect in Norway by examining the relationship between 
a range of liquidity variables and five different measures of the short-term interbank 
premium. The models are estimated on data from January 2007 and up to the end of 
September 2011, a period in which Norges Bank implemented its liquidity policy within a 
so-called floor system, and prior to the new liquidity system introduced on 3 October 
2011. In a floor system the key policy rate is equal to banks’ deposit rate in the central 
bank, and as such, this analysis provides new information on the liquidity effect in a floor 
system. Both excess liquidity (total central bank reserves in the banking system) and 
structural liquidity (central bank reserves in the system before Norges Banks’ market 
operations) have, as expected, a negative a significant effect on almost all dependent 
variables. Structural liquidity is the important factor driving the interbank premiums 
during periods characterized by low volatility, while excess liquidity gained importance 
during the financial crisis. This result is in line with what should be expected in a floor 
system. Furthermore, in periods of financial turmoil European and Norwegian banks may 
face higher USD rates in the interbank market either because of a general USD liquidity 
premium or an institution specific credit premium. My analysis provides additional insight 
in the division between the liquidity premium and the credit premium in a way, to my 
knowledge, not done in earlier literature. The results indicate that during the financial 
crisis (2007-2009) the liquidity premium dominated in USD as the availability of credit 
deteriorated.   
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1. Introduction 
Central banks normally manage bank reserves with a view to keep short-term interbank 
rates close to the key policy rate2. This is carried out by aiming at keeping the supply of 
reserves at the appropriate level, which depends on the liquidity management framework. 
However, independent of the liquidity framework, transfers of funds among banks need 
to be settled by reserves in the central bank. This creates liquidity risk as banks are 
obliged to hold a non-negative amount of reserves at the end of the day. Banks holding a 
negative amount of reserves need to borrow reserves from other banks in the interbank 
market, attract alternative types of funding from non-banks or use the central bank’s 
lending facility, the latter normally at a substantially higher cost. Then, according to 
theory, the cheaper are reserves the higher is the demand to avoid the risk of being forced 
to use the standing lending facility at the central bank. Hence, the widespread perception 
is that the short-term interest rate decreases with the amount of reserves, known as the 
liquidity effect.  
To effectively implement monetary policy it is important to understand how the supply 
of reserves affects interest rates. Whitesell (2006) establishes a theoretical framework for 
the demand for reserves, showing that the demand curve is downward sloping in line with 
the existence of a liquidity effect. However, he emphasizes that the slope of the demand 
curve may vary due to heterogeneous participants in the market, uneven distribution of 
reserves across banks and changes in banks’ risk perception. Hamilton (1997), Thornton 
(2001), Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) and Thornton (2006) have all searched for 
empirical evidence of a liquidity effect. Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) find “clear 
evidence of a liquidity effect at daily frequency”. Thornton (2006) also finds evidence of 
a liquidity effect, but states that this effect is relatively small. Thornton focuses on Fed’s 
forecast errors and how such errors contribute to changes in the effective fed funds rate. 
This methodology may mix the true liquidity effect and daily changes in the demand 
curve, cf. Whitesell (2006).  
This paper investigates the liquidity effect in Norway by analyzing the relationship 
between liquidity and different measures of short-term interest rates premiums (measured 
as the difference between the level of the interest rate and the expected policy key rate). 
The analysis is carried out by regressing the premiums on excess- and structural liquidity 
(to be defined below), in addition to several other variables which could affect the interest 
rate formation. The set of dependent variables contains two overnight rates and three 
tomorrow-next rates. The models are estimated on the period from the beginning of 
January 2007 up to the end of September 2011, when a new liquidity managing 
framework was introduced in Norway (to be discussed below). The regressions also cover 
three sub-samples to highlight differences prior to, under and after the financial crisis.  
As the Norwegian interbank market traditionally has been tied to the fx-forward market, 
in particular literature by Baba and Packer (2008a,2008b, 2009) and Coffey et. al. (2009) 
has gained attraction. A common feature of the papers of Baba and Packer is that they use 
the difference between the foreign exchange swap-implied three month dollar rate and the 
three-month dollar Libor rate as dependent variable in their estimations.3 They regress 
this variable on a set of explanatory variables, such as credit spreads between European 
and US financial institutions, US dollar term funding conducted by the ECB, and LIBOR-
 
2 “Reserves” and “liquidity” will be used interchangeably. In this paper both expressions mean the outstanding 
amount of central bank reserves. 
3 Liquidity risk is measured as the spread between the three-month agency mortgage-backed security and the Treasury repo 
interest rate. 
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OIS spreads between the euro and the US dollar. Coffey et. al. regress the same forward 
exchange swap deviation on similar variables such as default risk, counterparty risk, 
funding liquidity risk (as measured by the three-month spread between agency mortgage 
backed security and Treasury repo) and term risk.  
My study extends the existing literature in several ways. First, the methodology in my 
paper is an extension of Bernhardsen, Kloster, Syrstad and Smith (2009), and provides 
additional insight in the division between the liquidity premium and the credit premium 
in USD. In fact, the liquidity premium is separated from the credit premium in a way, to 
my knowledge, not applied in earlier literature. Second, a new dependent variable is used 
to isolate the impact of central bank reserves on foreign exchange(fx)-forwards. The fx-
forward market is of special interest in Norway as the official Norwegian interbank rate 
(NIBOR) has been linked to USD rates and the corresponding fx-forward price during the 
period of estimation. In order to fully understand how reserves affect the tomorrow-next 
rate a closer look at the fx-forward market is necessary. By constructing a cross-currency 
forward premium based on expected policy rates (OIS rates) and compare this to the 
actual fx-forward premium in the market it is possible to isolate the effects of central 
bank reserves (the liquidity effect) on fx-forward prices. Recalculated into basis points 
this variable will be referred to as the OIS-basis.4 This approach is similar to that of Baba 
and Packer (2009). Based on the regressions in this paper, it is possible to evaluate to 
what extent the USD-premium used by Norges Bank as a proxy for the risk premium 
faced by Norwegian banks has been driven by a general liquidity premium in USD or a 
credit premium. While the studies of Baba and Packer and Coffey et. al. do analyze how 
different explanatory variables affect the fx- swap deviation, this paper brings the 
discussion a step further, in distinguishing between the credit- and liquidity premium and 
explaining how the two types of premiums affect the fx-forward market. Third, new data 
from the settlement system and the forward market allows me to interpret how market 
structure affects different rates. This contributes to the evaluation of the liquidity 
management system and the measures taken during the financial crisis. Fourth, the paper 
contributes to the analysis of the short-term interest rate market in Norway, which, with a 
few exceptions, has not been a topic for research.5  
Overall, the results indicate the existence of a liquidity effect. This effect exists both for 
the overnight rates and the tomorrow-next rates. Moreover, uneven distribution of 
reserves leads to higher interest rates. Finally, the results indicate a contagion from the 
USD tomorrow-next rate to the corresponding Norwegian interest rate. This may be 
interpreted as a credit premium contagion from the USD-money market.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how monetary policy is 
implemented in Norway and how NIBOR historically has been computed. Section 3 
describes the econometric model and in section 4 the empirical results are discussed. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. Monetary policy, liquidity managing framework and money market in Norway6 
The monetary policy in Norway is based on an inflation targeting regime, introduced in 
March 2001. The operational target is steering towards an annual consumer price inflation 
 
4 Similar to the OIS-basis referred to by market participants. The OIS-basis could alternatively be constructed as the difference 
between the actual domestic OIS-rate and the implied OIS-rate based on a foreign OIS-rate and the corresponding fx-forwards 
between the currencies (for T/N-maturity the key policy rate replace the OIS-rate) 
5 All calculations are carried out in Eviews. 
6 This section draws on Bernhardsen, Kloster, Syrstad and Smith (2009). 
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of 2.5 per cent over time. The regime is flexible, meaning that weight is given to both 
variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. The key policy rate is 
set by the Executive Board with a view to stabilising inflation close to the target in the 
medium term. Three times a year a Monetary Policy Report is published. In the Report, 
Norges Bank analyses the current economic situation and publishes its economic 
forecasts. Since 2005 Norges Bank has published its own interest rate forecast, on which 
the reference scenario for the economic outlook is based. The monetary policy decision is 
implemented by steering the supply of reserves available to the banking system with the 
aim of keeping short-term money market rates close to the key policy rate.  
A range of different liquidity management frameworks exist. Broadly speaking these 
can be categorized as either a corridor- or a floor framework. Common for both is that 
they contain standing facilities, collateral schemes and in some instances reserve 
requirements. Within a corridor framework the central bank’s standing deposit rate is 
below, and the standing lending rate is above the key policy rate. In a pure corridor, 
without any reserve requirements, the central bank normally aims to keep total reserves in 
the banking system at zero, or marginally higher than zero.7 In a corridor with reserve 
requirements the target is normally determined by these requirements.8 If the demand for 
reserves exceeds the supply, the interest rate will increase towards the corridor ceiling, 
represented by the central bank’s standing lending rate. Similarly, if the supply of 
reserves exceeds the demand, the interest rate falls towards the floor of the corridor, 
represented by the central bank’s standing deposit rate.  
Up to 3 October 2011 Norges Bank implemented monetary policy within a floor 
system. In such a system the key policy rate is equal to the interest rate banks receive on 
their overnight deposits in the central bank (the central bank’s standing deposit rate). The 
deposit rate normally forms a floor for very short-term money market rates, as banks will 
normally not lend money at an interest rate lower than what they achieve at the central 
bank. Similarly, the central bank’s lending rate forms a ceiling for very short-term money 
market rates, as banks will normally not borrow money at a rate higher than what they 
have to pay the central bank. In a floor system the central bank must ensure that there is a 
surplus of reserves in the banking system. When banks’ deposits in the central bank are 
sufficiently large, very short-term money market rates will be pushed down towards the 
deposit rate. Norges Bank carried out this strategy by providing loans, normally of short 
maturity, to Norwegian banks. The floor system enabled Norges Bank to keep the short-
term rate close to the policy rate even in periods of extensive liquidity surplus. It made 
fine tuning operations unnecessary and simplified the liquidity management. The system 
was justified by the fact that autonomous factors in Norway fluctuate as a result of 
government transactions with the central bank.9 In a floor system, liquidity forecast errors 
normally have only a minor impact on short-term rates because of excess supply of 
liquidity in the banking system.10  
As from 3 October 2011 Norges Bank has administered the liquidity management 
through reserve quotas. In this system banks receive interest only on a specific portion of 
reserves – a quota – equivalent to the key policy rate. Deposits in excess of the quota bear 
lower interest – equivalent to the reserve rate. The reason for changing the system was to 
enhance the redistribution of liquidity in the interbank market and boost activity in the 
 
7 Examples are Canada and Sweden. 
8 Examples are UK and the euro area. 
9 Autonomous factors include, among others, developments in bank notes in circulation, transactions between banks and the 
government and fx-transactions conducted by Norges Bank. 
10 See Bernhardsen and Kloster (2010) for a detailed discussion about different liquidity management frameworks. 
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shortest segment of the money market, in addition to contain central bank reserves 
demand. Within this system Norges Banks steers the supply of liquidity by providing 
fixed rate loans and deposits, normally of short maturity, to Norwegian banks.11 Based on 
some months of experience, in the new system Norges Bank has managed to keep the 
level of reserves around the announced target, and short-term rates have remained fairly 
stable around the key policy rate.12  
Turning to the money market interest rates, they can be measured in terms of domestic 
rates reflecting rates on interbank borrowing and lending within one currency or, 
alternatively, on implied interest rates swapped from other currencies. Regarding the 
Norwegian short-term money market, only as from the beginning of October 2011 when 
the new liquidity system was introduced, an effective overnight interest rate has existed. 
The new system encouraged more overnight liquidity trading among banks, and after 
initiative taken by Norges Bank, Finance Norway13 took measures to quote a new 
overnight rate, NOWA (Norwegian Overnight Weighted Average). Prior to the 
introduction of NOWA and the new liquidity system, the most prominent part of the 
short-term money market was in the tomorrow–next fx-forward market. Chart 1 shows 
the two money market rates in addition to the policy key rate and the rates on Norges 
Bank’s standing facilities. Evidently, due to the floor system, operating until 3 October 
2011, the tomorrow-next rate has been close to Norges Bank’s deposit rate. As from the 
beginning of October 2011, the new overnight rate (NOWA) has fluctuated around the 
key rate.  
As my study covers the period from the beginning of 2007 up to the end of September 
2011, the tomorrow-next rate is the most important rate to base the analysis on. Notice 
that during my period of estimation the tomorrow-next rate was linked to the USD-dollar 
rate and the fx-forward swap market, it was basically a swap interest rate (implied interest 
rate from USD). This means that the tomorrow-next rate could be written as   
 
(1) iNIBOR  =  i$ +  (f-e) 
where i$ is the dollar funding rate, e is the (log of) the exchange rate (the amount of NOK 
per unit of dollar, hence an increase indicates a depreciation of NOK), f is the (log of) the 
forward exchange rate and iNIBOR is the swap rate on NOK. The term (f-e) is referred to as 
the forward exchange premium.  
In countries, where domestic money market rates exist alongside with swap rates, 
covered interest rate parity can be tested by comparing the domestic rate with the swap 
rate. In Norway, however, during my period of estimation, the Norwegian money market 
rate was merely defined by equation (1). It means that NIBOR was supposed to reflect the 
dollar funding rate of banks in the NIBOR-panel plus the forward premium traded in the 
market.14, 15 
 
11 See www.norges-bank.no (under “price stability”/”Liquidity management”) for more details on the new system and the 
background for the change. 
12 Since the introduction of the new system in October 2011, Norges Bank’s target for total reserves in the banking system has 
been NOK 35 billion. 
13 Finance Norway (FNO) is the trade organisation for banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions in Norway. 
14 Until mid-2011 formal rules for calculating and publishing NIBOR did not exist. After initiative taken by Norges Bank, Finance 
Norway (Finansnæringenes Hovedorganisasjon), took measures to formalise and publish rules for quoting NIBOR. According to 
the new rules, ...NIBOR is intended to reflect the interest rate level lenders require for unsecured money market lending in NOK 
with delivery in two days after trade. The rules adopted by FNO apply to NIBOR with maturities of one week, two weeks, one 
month, two months, three months, four months, five months, six months, nine months and twelve months...For more information 
on NOWA and the rules for quoting NIBOR, see http://www.fno.no/en/main/markets/ 
15 The actual dollar funding rate available to and used by banks in the NIBOR-panel as a basis for the NIBOR fixing is unknown. 
Moreover, at the micro level, the rates on NOK offered by individual banks in the NIBOR-panel may differ slightly as banks may 
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In the analysis below, based on data prior to the publication of the new definition of 
NIBOR, three measures of the money market risk premium will be based on the 
tomorrow-next rate, while two measures will be based on less liquid overnight rates, that 
also existed prior to the introduction of NOWA.   
3. The Econometric Model 
To analyze how liquidity and the distribution of liquidity across banks affect the short-
term interest rate premium the following model is estimated: 
(2)    i  =  α + Bex.liq ex.liq + Bstr.liq str.liq + Berr err + Bdist dist + Bsprd sprd + Busd usd 
where ex.liq and str.liq are respectively excess and structural liquidity (reserves), to be 
defined below, err is Norges Banks liquidity forecast error, dist is the distribution of 
reserves across banks, sprd is the fx-forward bid-ask-spread and usd is the dollar money 
market premium. In the model i represent five different measures of the short-term 
interest rate premium (dependent variable), all of them being regressed on the set of six 
explanatory variables. We first discuss the dependent variables, then the explanatory 
ones.     
3.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are NONIA (O/N), NIDR (O/N), T/N-NIBOR, T/N-Norges Bank 
in addition to a variable, which will be referred to as the OIS-basis and explained in more 
details in section 3.3. All the dependent variables are measured as the difference between 
the interest rate level and the expected policy rate. 
NONIA (O/N) is the Norwegian Overnight Index Average, an overnight rate inferred 
from overnight transactions settled in the real-time gross settlement system. Akram and 
Christoffersen (2010) discuss the details and show that NONIA has stayed historically 
very close to the key policy rate. NONIA is not published on a regular basis. 
NIDR (O/N) is the Norwegian Interbank Deposit Rate. Only three banks are quoting 
NIDR, which is not traded in the market.16 It is an equal weighted average of the three 
individual banks` quotes, published by Reuters. Despite the low number of contributing 
banks, this rate is considered as a good representation of the overnight rate. 
The shortest maturity quoted in NIBOR is NIBOR-Tomorrow/Next (T/N). It is published 
by Reuters and based on a USD rate and the forward premium (cf. equation 1). The 
underlying forwards associated with this rate is quoted with large bid/ask spreads. Being 
a NIBOR bank requires an obligation to quote tradable forward prices up to an amount of 
50 million NOK. Due to precautionary reasons this may contribute to larger bid/ask 
spreads.  
Tomorrow/Next-Norges Bank: In order to adjust for high bid/ask spreads in NIBOR, 
Norges Bank computes an internal T/N-rate, based on actual forward trades done through 
Reuter Dealing and a USD-rate equal to the average of the USD T/N-rates quoted by 
Tullett Prebon and Carl Kliem (brokers)17. This rate gives Norges Bank a good indication 
of the actual interest rate level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
face different rates for unsecured borrowing in dollars. Moreover, the low number of active banks (only six NIBOR banks) in the 
Norwegian money market makes the market structure rather unique. In addition, with a market share of approximately 40 per 
cent, the commercial bank DNB has a dominant position. It is also worth noting that international players are active in the forward 
market, but less so in the Overnight-market. As such, competition in the two market-segments differs.  
16 The banks are DNB, Danske Bank and Nordea. 
17 This is the same usd-rate used as explanatory variable in the regressions. 
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3.2 Explanatory variables 
Structural liquidity (str.liq) and excess liquidity (ex.liq). In particular transactions 
between the banks and the Government change the supply of reserves in the banking 
system. Structural liquidity is the level of reserves in the banking system that would 
prevail in the absence of any interference (liquidity provision or draining operations) by 
the central bank. Structural liquidity may be positive or negative dependent on the 
development of autonomous factors. By supplying reserves to or draining reserves from 
the system Norges Bank keeps the total level of reserves at the appropriate level. Both 
structural and excess liquidity are expected to have a separate negative effect on the 
money market premium (the liquidity effect). Structural liquidity may have a separate 
effect (given excess liquidity) because lower structural liquidity may increase the 
uncertainty about banks own future liquidity position. Low structural liquidity also 
increases bank`s borrowing in the central bank (for a given level of excess reserves), 
which may increase the concentration of the reserves intraday and unwillingness among 
banks to lend reserves. Anecdotic information indicates that especially foreign banks are 
worried about the concentration of reserves, hence this effect may be particularly 
pronounced in the fx-forward market.18 Hence Bex.liq and Bstr.liq are both expected to be 
negative.  
Norges Bank’s liquidity forecast errors (err). Norges Bank publishes forecasts for 
structural liquidity, defined as actual outcome minus the forecast. If structural liquidity 
comes out higher than forecasted, the money market premium may fall. Hence Berr is 
expected to be negative.19  
The distribution (dist) of reserves across banks may be important for short-term interest 
rates. When liquidity is concentrated amongst few banks, other participants may need to 
raise their bids in order to borrow reserves. The variable is constructed as follows: in the 
settlement system in the central bank one bank will, at the end of each day, have the 
largest amount of reserves. This amount is divided by total amount of reserves. The 
coefficient Bdist is expected to be positive.20   
The bid/ask spread in the forward market (sprd) indicates lower liquidity and higher 
volatility in the forward market. This may lead to higher T/N-rates as they are directly 
calculated on the basis of the forwards (cf. equation (1)), but may also be a proxy for 
increased financial volatility in general, which may be associated with higher overnight 
rates. Hence Bsprd is expected to be positive.   
The USD-premium (usd) is the difference between the USD T/N and the expected 
policy rate, the former being the average of USD T/N-rates from two interbank brokers, 
Carl Kliem and Tullett Prebon. Depending on the cause of a higher USD-premium the 
Norwegian money market premium will be differently affected. In fact, the effect on the 
Norwegian premium depends on whether a higher USD-premium stems from a dollar 
liquidity premium faced by all banks or a credit premium which can differ across 
institutions. To understand this we have to make a side-step and explain the  OIS-basis in 
 
18 Foreign banks are more active in the tomorrow-next market, closely linked to the fx-forward market. 
19 Thornton (2006) uses the central bank forecast error to measure the liquidity effect in the US. During his sample period Federal 
Reserve operated within a corridor framework, paying no interests on excess reserves. One of the advantages of a floor framework 
is considered to be the ability to absorb forecast errors without significantly increasing interest rate volatility. Forecast errors are 
included to examine this feature.  
20 This effect is probably greater in a floor system, where the cost of depositing excess reserves at the central bank is lower, than 
within a corridor system.  
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details, as the dependent OIS-basis and the two dependent variables T/N-NIBOR and T/N-
NB are connected, but oppositely affected by the USD-premium. As will turn out to be 
the case, when the OIS-basis is the dependent variable, the coefficient Busd is expected to 
be negative. On the other hand, when either of the tomorrow/next-variables or the 
overnight-variables is dependent variables, the coefficient Busd is expected to be positive. 
This will be the topic for the section below.   
3.3 The OIS-basis, the USD liquidity premium and the credit premium 
Contrary to the four dependent variables discussed in 3.1, which are straight forward to 
interpret, the OIS-basis needs considerably more explanation. As will turn out to be the 
case, the variable can be interpreted as an indicator of the major dislocation in the foreign 
exchange forward market witnessed during the financial crisis. The variable is 
constructed as the difference between the forward premium and the expected policy rate 
differential. A simple model for the money market risk premium based on the fx-forward 
market helps to illustrate the OIS-basis.21  The model can be written as  
(3) iN = iN,$ + (f-e)  
(4) iN,$ = OIS$ + rp$ + rpN,$ 
(5) rp$  = i$ - OIS$    
(6) rpN = iN - OISN 
where equation (3) is equal to equation (1). Equation (4) defines the dollar rate foreign 
banks (and thereby Norwegian banks) have to pay for unsecured dollar in the money 
market. It consists of the expected overnight rate in the market as measured by the OIS-
rate22 plus an additional money market premium faced by all banks (rp$), including both a 
liquidity premium and a credit premium in addition to a credit premium faced by foreign 
banks only (rpN,$). The latter can be positive or negative andif foreign banks do not face 
an additional credit premium, rpN,$ = 0. Moreover, equation (5) and (6) define the money 
market risk premium for NOK and USD, respectively. By substituting (3), (4) and (5) 
into (6), we obtain 
(7) rpN =rp$ + rpN,$ + (f-e) - (OISN -OIS$) 
Disregarding the credit premium rpN,$ for a moment, we see that the NOK money 
market premium (rpN) is equal to the US premium adjusted for the difference between the 
forward premium in the market and the difference between the OIS-differential, the latter 
being referred to as the “theoretical” forward premium. Our dependent variable OIS-basis 
is defined as  
(8) OIS-basis = (f-e) - (OISN -OIS$) 
To understand the basic intuition behind the OIS-basis, we proceed as follows: First, we 
argue that under normal circumstances, the OIS-basis is zero. Second, we explain that an 
increase in the overall dollar liquidity premium affects the OIS-basis negatively. Third, 
we argue that a credit premium faced by individual institutions or groups of financial 
 
21 Below I extend the model presented in Bernardsen, Kloster, Syrstad and Smith (2009).The model holds for all currency crosses, 
but the USD/NOK is used throughout the paper. 
22 Overnight Indexed Swap 
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institutions (not attached to a specific currency) will theoretically leave the OIS-basis 
unchanged.  
Turning to the first issue, why is the OIS-basis normally zero? The theoretical forward 
premium is by definition given by the difference between the OIS-rates which are 
determined by the expected path of policy rates in the respective currencies. Let us 
illustrate this by an example.23 Assume that the domestic three-month OIS-rate is lower 
than the three-month dollar OIS-rate plus the actual forward premium, i.e. OISN < 
OIS$+(f-e). Then, borrow domestic currency in the domestic overnight market, roll over 
the debt daily for three months and enter into an OIS-contract to change the floating 
overnight rate on the debt for a fixed rate. The borrower then disposes a given amount of 
domestic currency for three months at the cost given by the three-month domestic OIS- 
rate. Change the domestic currency for dollar spot, invest the resulting amount of dollar 
in the overnight dollar market, roll over the dollar investment daily for three months and 
enter into an overnight swap contract to change the floating overnight dollar rate on the 
investment for a fixed rate. The investor then knows the interest rate he or she will obtain 
over the three months and the corresponding amount in dollar. Sell this amount of dollar 
in the forward foreign exchange market and obtain domestic currency in three months, 
the amount being determined by the forward rate traded in the market today. If the actual 
forward premium equals the difference between the OIS-rates, the gain from borrowing 
overnight in the domestic market and lending in the overnight dollar market will be zero. 
If the domestic OIS-rate is lower than the dollar OIS-rate plus the actual forward 
premium, the gain will be positive. Due to arbitrage the actual forward premium will 
adjust to equal the difference between the OIS-rates, and hence the theoretical forward 
premium and the forward premium will be equal.24  
Chart 2 shows the OIS-basis (the difference between the three-month actual forward 
premium and the theoretical forward premium) for NOK, SEK, GBP and EUR, all 
relative to USD. Until the financial turmoil started in August 2007 the difference was 
around zero for all currencies (“normal” situation). Thereafter, and in particular after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, they have been negative. This 
reflects dollar shortage: as credit in dollar became scarce, it was more difficult to obtain 
dollar funding and the dollar money market premium increased. Hence financial 
institutions tried to obtain dollar through the foreign exchange market. They sold local 
currency and bought USD spot, and sold USD and bought local currency forward. This 
implied that the forward exchange rate and hence the forward premium fell (Δf<0) and 
took values substantially below the theoretical forward premium.25 Later on, the Fed took 
several measures to increase the supply of dollar26, which reduced financial institutions’ 
need for obtaining dollar through the fx-swap market. Hence both the need for buying 
dollar spot and the need for selling dollar forward declined, leading to an increase in the 
 
23 The following example is based on three-month maturity. However, identical reasoning applies for all maturities, including the 
T/N. The difference between the T/N and longer maturities is that an OIS-contract is superflous. For shorter maturities the 
”arbitrage” argument is stronger as (i)the central bank normally supply short term liquidity and, (ii) the roll over risk associated 
with this kind of arbitrage is lower. 
24 Strictly speaking, these transactions do not represent pure arbitrage. The agent must face the risk of not being able to roll over 
the loan in the domestic currency on a daily basis for three months. This risk may be assessed as significant in times of heightened 
market stress. However, most central banks have supplied large amounts of liquidity during the crisis, which in turn have led to 
ample supply of overnight funds in the money markets.   
25 Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy (2009) discuss in more detail how in particular non-US banks turned to foreign exchange 
swap markets to obtain dollar against European currencies. Baba and Packer (2008) argue that sharp and persistent deviations 
from the CIP condition are related to differences in counterparty risk between European and US financial institutions.     
26 See Bernanke (2009) for more details on measures taken by Fed. 
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forward premium. In terms of our model, the difference between the forward premium 
and the theoretical forward premium approached the normal level of zero.        
As the second issue, we now turn to the effect of a dollar liquidity premium on the OIS-
basis. Essentially, a liquidity premium hits all financial institutions simultaneously27. 
Hence, banks will try to acquire dollar through the forward exchange market when access 
to other currencies are plentiful. They buy USD and sell local currency spot and sell USD 
and buy local currency forward, implying a stronger forward rate (Δf<0) and a lower 
forward premium. This process will go on as long as financial institutions can acquire 
dollar through the forward market cheaper as directly in the USD money market. Put 
differently, the process continues until the forward rate has fallen as much as the dollar 
premium has risen, i.e. until Δf=-ΔiN,$=-Δrp$. The implication is that the forward 
premium falls and encounters the effect of the dollar liquidity premium on the local 
money market premium, hence ΔrpN=0. In the case of a liquidity premium the dislocation 
may remain because the currency is relatively scarce creating an excessive demand for 
this currency in the fx-swap market.28 This line of arguments can easily be transferred to 
the T/N-maturity as well. For T/N-maturity it is, however, not necessary to enter an OIS 
contract since the maturity is only one day. The dislocations in very short term fx-
forwards are limited compared to longer terms as central banks very fast increase the 
supply of short term liquidity and the roll over risk connected to exploiting the dislocation 
is lower, illustrated by comparing Chart 2 and the OIS-basis in Chart 3.    
Turning to the third issue, a credit premium is transferred into the local money market 
premium (in contrast to the liquidity premium) via the fx-forward market. Normally, 
investors require the same institution-specific credit premium independently of the 
currency of issuance. Indeed, at the outset, if some banks face higher credit premium in 
USD than in NOK they may try to acquire dollar through the fx-forward market. They 
buy USD and sell local currency spot and sell USD and buy local currency forward, 
analogously to the liquidity premium situation. This will in itself put downward pressure 
on the forward rate. Let f* denote this new and lower rate. Banks not facing a higher 
credit premium can now engage in arbitrage and obtain an expected gain because 
OISN>OIS$+(f*-e). This can easily happen because there is no scarcity in US dollar and 
the credit is readily available. They can borrow USD overnight, roll over the debt daily in 
three months, enter into a three-month OIS-contract and fix the interest rate of the debt. 
Initially, they change the dollar for local currency spot, invest the local currency 
overnight, roll over the investment daily for three months and enter into an OIS contract 
to fix the interest rate of the investment. Also initially, they can sell forward the amount 
in local currency resulting from the investment and buy USD at the price f*. At the price 
f* the gain will be positive. This arbitrage activity will at the same time put an upward 
pressure on the forward rate (Δf>0), since local currency is sold forward. This upward 
pressure on the forward rate will encounter the downward pressure stemming from 
higher-credit-premium-banks trying to acquire dollar through the forward market. In 
particular, when the banks with the lower credit premium dominate the market (in size 
and trading activities) the higher-credit-premium-banks will not manage to influence the 
forward premium. Hence, banks facing a higher credit premium in USD will continue to 
use local currencies as funding until investors require identical credit premium in all 
 
27 During the financial crisis, banks who did not have access to central bank facilities in Federal Reserve may have been more 
affected than other banks. 
28 Volume and line constraints between banks may be another source of dislocations. During the financial crisis deleveraging and 
balance sheet restrictions in the banking sector contributed to the persistence of the dislocation in the foreign exchange forward 
market even after dollar availability improved and the dislocation in the T/N-swap market disappeared. 
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currencies. Absence of liquidity constraints in both currencies will trigger “arbitrage” 
activity. This illustrates that the OIS-basis expresses the relative liquidity premium 
between currencies, and is not influenced by the credit premium.29 30 
We can now turn to the regression where we focus on the two T/N-variables and the 
OIS-basis as dependent variables. Starting with the OIS-basis, a higher usd-premium 
stemming from a USD liquidity shortage (liquidity premium) will have a negative effect. 
However, a higher usd-premium stemming from foreign banks (including Norwegian 
ones) facing a higher credit premium will have no effect on the OIS-basis. Hence the 
estimated coefficient of the usd-premium will reflect to what extent the usd-premium has 
been a liquidity premium or a credit premium. For example, assume that the coefficient 
(Busd) is estimated to be -0.7. This means that on average 70 per cent of the usd-premium 
has been a liquidity premium (which transfers one-to-one to the OIS-basis) and 30 per 
cent a credit premium, which does not transfer to the OIS-basis at all.31 Notice that this 
interpretation is only possible because the regressions include specific variables supposed 
to capture the liquidity condition in NOK. If not, it would not be possible to distinguish 
between the credit premium and the liquidity premium, since the OIS-basis represent the 
relative liquidity premium between the two currencies. 
In the regression with the T/N-rates as dependent variables the effect is opposite. A 
higher usd-premium caused by a USD-liquidity premium does not affect the T/N-
premiums at all, the reason being that the forward premium (as reflected in the OIS-basis) 
adjusts one-to-one. Moreover, a higher credit premium affects the T/N-rates in order one-
to-one. For example, assume that the coefficient (Busd) is estimated to be 0.3. This means 
that on average, 30 percent of the usd-premium has been a credit premium, while 70 per 
cent has been a liquidity premium.32 
We see that the different regressions provide different ways to measure to what extent a 
USD-premium will be transferred into the Norwegian money market premium. A priori 
(at least within our model) a credit premium will be transferred into the Norwegian 
money market premium in order one-to-one, while a liquidity premium will not affect it 
at all. A posteriori (averaged over the sample) the estimated coefficient of the USD-
premium gives us a share; the share reflects to what extent the USD-premium hit by 
Norwegian banks has been a liquidity premium faced by all banks or a credit premium 
faced by Norwegian banks only. With the tomorrow/next-rates as dependent variable the 
coefficient is the share of the credit premium. With OIS-basis as dependent variable, the 
coefficient is the share of the liquidity premium. Theoretically, the absolute value of the 
coefficient Busd in the regression with OIS-basis as dependent variable (|Busd,OIS-basis|) plus 
the coefficient Busd in the regression with the tomorrow/next-variables as dependent 
variable (Busd,T/N) should be unity, i.e. |Busd,OIS-basis| + Busd,T/N = 1.  
In sum, both T/N-rates are expected to increase in the usd-premium (hence Busd is 
positive) and the OIS-basis is expected to decrease in the usd-premium (hence Busd is 
negative). In the regressions with the overnight rates as dependent variables, the usd-
 
29 In practice, the separation between the liquidity and credit premium is less clear than presented here. However, the main point 
to be made is that the credit premium is not currency specific while the liquidity premium is. The fx-forward market adjusts for 
the relative liquidity premium between two currencies.  
30 It is possible that counterparty risk could influence the OIS-basis through higher market risk (the risk of foreign exchange rate 
movements in case of a counterparty default) and increased settlement risk. 
31 To be sure, it does not mean that 70 per cent of all changes in the USD-premium transfers to the OIS-basis, the USD-premium 
affects the OIS-basis either one-to one (liquidity premium), or not at all (credit premium).    
32 Again, to be sure, it does not mean that 30 per cent of all changes in the USD premium transfers into the Norwegian money 
market premium. The USD-premium affects the Norwegian money market premium either one-to one (credit premium), or not at 
all (liquidity premium).    
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variable may interpreted as a financial volatility variable and the coefficient Busd is 
expected to be positive. 
 
3.4 Data 
The dataset used in the regressions starts in January 2007 and ends in September 2011.33 
Holydays and missing data are omitted. In total there are between 1099 and 1129 
observations depending on the choice of dependent variable. The variables are precisely 
defined in Table 1a, while Table 1b shows some standard descriptive statistics of all 
variables. Figure 2 shows all variables, while table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the 
variables. Moreover, all variables are stationary, with low p-values of the Dickey-Fuller 
null hypothesis.  
Excess- and structural liquidity, forecast errors, the distribution variable and NONIA are 
computed and collected from internal sources in Norges Bank.34 NIDR and T/N-NIBOR 
are available at Reuters. T/N-Norges Bank and the OIS-basis are computed by Norges 
Bank,  based on fx-forward prices from Reuter Dealing and exchange rate data and broker 
T/N-rates from Reuters. 
 
4. Results 
The models are estimated on the whole sample (1 January 2007 to 30 September 2011) 
and on three subsample periods. Subsample 1 starts on January 1 2007 and ends on 
August 1 2008 and covers the period prior to the height of the crisis. The second 
subsample starts on August 2 2008 and ends on June 1 2009, covering the financial crisis 
at its height. The last subsample covers the period from June 2 2009 until September 30 
2010, i.e., the aftermath of the crisis.   
All models are estimated with OLS and reported in Tables 3a-3e, with t-statistics based 
on Newey-West standard errors. Each table covers the full sample and the three 
subsamples. We first concentrate on the estimated liquidity effect.  
 
4.1 The liquidity effect 
In general, looking at all models over the whole sample and the different subsamples, 
the data indicates the existence of a liquidity effect, meaning that higher structural and/or 
excess liquidity reduces the money market premium measured by the five dependent 
variables. Out of 40 coefficients, only two of them are significant with the wrong 
(positive) sign, 28 are significant with the expected (negative) sign, while the rest is not 
significantly different from zero. However, as will be explained below, it is not surprising 
that some of the coefficients in some of the sub sample periods are not significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, the whole-period estimates reflect (and disguise) the 
results of the different sub samples, and to understand the relationship between the money 
risk premiums and liquidity, we need to go into the subsample results in some detail.    
The following results are fairly robust:  
 
33 However, chart 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are based on data until 18 November 2011.   
34 Excess- and structural liquidity are published at Norges banks webpage www.norges-bank.no. NONIA and the distribution 
variable are not publicly available.  
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 For the full sample regressions, both structural and excess liquidity have a significant 
effect with the expected negative sign on all dependent variables (except for NIBOR-
tomorrow next, on which excess liquidity has no significant effect).   
 In the subsample prior to the crisis (subsample 1), the so to say “normal period” of the 
three subsamples, structural liquidity is the important liquidity factor driving the money 
market premiums. While structural liquidity has a significant effect with the expected 
sign in all of the models, excess liquidity is not significant in any of them (except for the 
OIS-basis, where the estimated effect of excess liquidity is significant, with the expected 
negative sign). 
 In the subsample covering the height of the crisis (subsample 2) total liquidity becomes 
more important than structural liquidity (except for T/N-NIBOR), though structural 
liquidity still has some explanatory power on the risk premiums.  
 In the subsample after the crisis the results are less clear. For NONIA structural liquidity 
seems to be more important than excess liquidity, while for NIDR it is opposite. For 
tomorrow-next calculated by Norges Bank and the OIS-basis excess liquidity is 
important, while structural liquidity is not. Finally, for NIBOR tomorrow-next, only 
structural liquidity is significant. 
The estimated effect of excess and structural liquidity on the risk premiums must be 
interpreted in light of Norges Bank’s system for managing reserves during the estimation 
period. During the whole estimation period, Norges Bank operated within a so-called 
floor system for managing reserves. As discussed in the introduction, within such a 
system banks can deposit any amount of reserves at the central bank, all of them being 
remunerated at the key rate. In a floor system the liquidity policy of the central bank is to 
supply a sufficient amount of liquidity to the banking system to ensure that the short-term 
money market rate remains close to the key policy rate. The key policy rate then acts as a 
floor for the short-term rate, as no banks will lend reserves in the market at a rate lower 
than the deposit rate at the central bank. In brief, in such a system there are plenty of 
reserves – or liquidity. 
 In normal times – within a floor-system – an increase in total reserves does not 
necessarily have a strong impact on money market premiums. Short-term interest rates 
are initially close to the key policy rate, and adding reserves to the banking system does 
not induce banks to lend more reserves in the market, a condition normally seen as 
necessary to reduce short-term interest rate and hence premiums. Banks simply accept the 
supply of reserves and want to keep them as overnight deposit at the central bank.35 The 
reason is that the cost of holding reserves at the central bank is low, as the reserves are 
remunerated at the key rate, which again is close to the money market rate of shortest 
maturity. Hence, the floor-system may explain why excess reserves seem to have only a 
minor effect on risk premiums in normal times (subsample 1). In contrast, structural 
liquidity seems to have a larger effect during low volatility periods than during the crisis. 
One possible explanation is that when structural liquidity is low, banks become more 
uncertain regarding their own future liquidity position (i.e. their future deposits at the 
central bank). They therefore try to acquire more reserves in the market, pushing the 
short-term rate and hence the premium up. Furthermore, lending from the central bank 
 
35 Of course, if the banks would try to lend the reserves in the market, the reserves would still end up as overnight deposits at the 
central bank at the end of the day. The crucial point here, is that banks in a floor system normally do not even have an incentive to 
try to lend the reserves in the market.     
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increases when structural liquidity decreases, this in turn may affect the concentration of 
liquidity intraday. Higher short term interest rates could be the outcome. Liquidity 
outflow connected to lower structural liquidity may also surprise some banks, which in 
turn may bid up the interest rate. This effect is especially related to the floor-framework, 
which implies a low alternative cost of hoarding reserves. However, in periods of crisis 
(subsample 2), total liquidity gains importance in explaining the risk premiums. In 
periods characterized by high volatility and uncertainty the demand for liquidity increases 
and substantially more liquidity may be needed to be supplied to prevent short-term rates 
from rising. Hence, more liquidity may dampen upward pressure on the short-term rate 
and premiums.  
Turning to the more specific results, Tables 3a and 3b report the estimation results for 
the two overnight rates, NONIA and NIDR. Focusing on the full sample, both rates show 
the existence of a significant liquidity effect (with the expected negative sign). The 
estimated coefficients indicate that a one billion increase in excess liquidity and structural 
liquidity reduces the NONIA-spread by 0.074 and 0.068 basis points, respectively. The 
liquidity effect in NIDR is somewhat smaller. As mentioned above, there are differences 
between the sub-samples, with structural liquidity more important in the pre-crisis period 
and total liquidity more important during the crisis. During the crisis demand for liquidity 
increased substantially. Norges Bank responded by increasing the supply of liquidity. In 
addition, maturity of liquidity was extended. This probably reduced the uncertainty 
related to changes in structural liquidity. Moreover, the effect of the liquidity variables on 
the premiums, as measured by the estimated coefficients, is larger during the period of 
crisis. This is no surprise, as liquidity demand is higher in such times.       
Table 3c presents the results from the estimations using NIBOR tomorrow-next as the 
dependent variable. A striking result is that excess liquidity is not significant in the full 
sample estimation, neither in any of the subsamples. This can be explained by the wide 
bid/ask forward spreads in the T/N NIBOR-rate, meaning that the spreads are large 
enough to capture the variation caused by the liquidity effect connected to excess 
liquidity. The quoted bid/ask spreads in NIBOR widened substantially when the financial 
crisis hit. The effect of structural liquidity is still negative and significant over the full 
sample, though a closer look at the subsample periods shows, not surprisingly, that 
structural liquidity has a significant effect only in sub sample 1, the “normal” pre-crisis 
period (as NONIA and NIDR). 
Tables 3d and 3e show the results from the estimations using respectively the 
tomorrow-next variable calculated by Norges Bank and the OIS-basis. For both variables 
a liquidity effect exists. As discussed above, in the normal pre-crisis period (sub sample 
1), structural liquidity is important. During the crisis however, excess liquidity gained 
importance and both structural and excess liquidity have a significant effect. During the 
crisis (sub sample 2) the coefficients are considerably higher than in the period of 
normality (sub sample 1). As for the other variables, this indicates that the riskiness 
connected to large drops in structural liquidity is high. The uncertainty may be related to 
the fear of Norges Bank not providing sufficient amount of liquidity, uneven distribution 
of reserves from the liquidity providing operations and insufficient knowledge by foreign 
banks about the Norwegian framework. As for the third subsample, even if the demand 
for liquidity decreased, it was far from normalized. This is reflected in both the 
coefficients and the significance levels in the last subsample.  
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4.2 The effect of the remaining explanatory variables on the risk premiums  
Turning to the other explanatory variables, we first look at the USD-premium. In 
general, for the whole sample, the USD-premium has a significant effect with the 
expected sign in all models. However, the full-sample results disguise differences across 
the sub-samples. 
We start with the tomorrow-next variable calculated by Norges Bank (T/N-Norges 
Bank) and the OIS-basis, respectively Tables 3d and 3e. We should keep in mind the 
discussion above: If the USD premium reflects a credit premium faced by Norwegian 
banks, it will be transferred into the tomorrow-next rate premium, but not into the OIS-
basis. If the higher USD premium is caused by a general liquidity premium, however, it 
will have a negative effect on the OIS-basis, but no effect on the tomorrow-next rate 
premium. Though this is a strict theoretic result, to be modified in practice as it may be 
difficult to distinguish a credit premium from a liquidity premium, the estimation results 
for the T/N-Norges Bank variable and the OIS-basis should be interpreted in light of this.  
 Data indicates that the USD-premium has a significant effect on the OIS-basis in sub 
sample 1 and 2, respectively the period prior to the crisis (but with some turbulence as 
from the mid of 2007) and the period covering the height of the crisis. The estimated 
coefficient is around 0.9 in both sub samples. With reference to equation (7) the 
interpretation is as follows: Assuming the USD premium increases by 100 basis points 
(Δrp$=100), the OIS-basis declines by 90 basis points (Δ (f-e) - (OISN -OIS$) = -90 bp.), 
implying that the domestic money market premium increases by 10 basis points (ΔrpN=10 
bp.). This means that on average, the forward exchange market dampened the effect of 
the USD-premium on the domestic premium by around 90 per cent.36 Furthermore, it 
implies that around 90 per cent of the increase in the USD-premium in subsamples 1 and 
2 has been due to a USD liquidity premium and 10 per cent due to a credit premium faced 
by Norwegian banks.37 This result, which indicates that a liquidity premium is the main 
source of the USD premium, is consistent with the view that in the period from mid 2007, 
and in particular during the autumn of 2008, a dollar shortage led to an excessive demand 
for dollar through the forward exchange market.  
At the same time, we see that the estimated effect of the USD-premium on the 
tomorrow-next rate premium calculated by Norges Bank (Table 3d) is around 0.1 in both 
subsample 2 and 3. The coefficients are only borderline significant, but for the moment, 
concentrate on the size of them. The interpretation is that around 10 per cent of the USD-
premium has been due to a credit premium and around 90 per cent due to a liquidity 
premium.  
Hence, both regressions suggest that 90 per cent of the USD-premium has been due to a 
liquidity premium and 10 per cent due to a risk premium. These coefficients are in line 
with the theoretical discussion above: The absolute value of the coefficient Busd in the 
regression with OIS-basis as dependent variable (|Busd,OIS-basis|) plus the coefficient Busd 
in the regression with T/N-Norges Bank as dependent variable (Busd,T/N) should be unity, 
i.e. |Busd,OIS-basis| + Busd,T/N = 1.  
 
36 The mechanism is as described in section 3.3: when a liquidity premium hits all financial institutions simultaneously, they will 
all try to acquire dollar through the forward exchange market. They buy USD and sell local currency spot and sell USD and buy 
local currency forward, implying a stronger forward rate (Δf<0) and a lower forward premium. 
37 Since a liquidity premium transfers to the OIS-basis in order one-to-one, and the T/N-Norges Bank premium not at all, while a 
credit premium transfers to the T/N-Norges Bank premium in order one-to-one, and to the OIS-basis not at all.  
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For subsamples 1 and 2 a USD liquidity premium (and not a credit premium) was 
dominant from around mid 2007 and during the height of the crisis. This changes in 
subsample 3, the period after the height of the crisis. In this period the USD-premium 
coefficient is considerably lower for the OIS-basis and correspondingly larger for the 
T/N-premium. By the same kind of argument as above, the interpretation is that the USD-
premium in this period was stemming from a credit premium and not a liquidity 
premium. During this period, central banks, in particular Fed, supplied a substantial 
amount of  USD to market participants. This reduced the USD liquidity premium. A 
higher credit premium faced by the NIBOR-banks may be the result of the European 
sovereign crisis, where European and Norwegian banks, at least to some extent, may have 
been considered as belonging to the same group of banks with higher credit risk. 
However, though the effect of the USD premium on the T/N-rate premium is significant, 
the size of the coefficient is low, meaning that the credit premium faced by NIBOR-banks 
is not very high.   
Turning to the results for the tomorrow-next rate quoted by the NIBOR banks (T/N-
NIBOR, Table 3c), it is striking that the USD premium has a significant effect in sub 
sample 2, the height of the crisis, while the effect is less (with at most borderline 
significance) on the tomorrow-next rate calculated by Norges Bank (T/N-Norges Bank, 
Table 3d). This may be due to wide bid/ask spreads in T/N-NIBOR. During subsample 2 
bid/ask spreads in the fx-forward market widened substantially as a response to higher 
liquidity risk. Norges Banks own fx-forward sample consists of trades within the quoted 
spread on Reuters. Fluctuations in the USD-premium, which mostly consisted of a 
liquidity premium, was then offset by fx-forwards in real forward trades, while wide 
bid/ask spreads made it unnecessary to adjust quoted forward prices. The USD-premium 
also has a significant effect on the two overnight rates NONIA and NIDR, respectively 
Tables 3a and 3b, notably in subsample 2, the height of the crisis. The overnight rates are 
not directly affected by the usd-rate like the T/N-rates, but this variable may be 
interpreted as a measure of general risk. 
Turning to the distribution variable, it has no significant effect on NONIA, but has a 
significant effect on NIDR in subsample 1. NONIA is measured as actual trades observed 
in the settlement system. Anecdotal information suggests a “gentlemen agreement” 
among banks in the overnight-market, meaning that a supplier of liquidity, anticipating 
that he or she can be on the other side of the market another day, accepts rates close to the 
key rate. This reduces the interest rate variability and may explain why the distribution-
variable has no significant effect on NONIA. In contrast, NIDR is a quoted rate in which 
the participating banks are committed to quote binding prices for 250 mill NOK at the 
fixing (14pm for the O/N-rate). The three contributing banks, Danske Bank, DNB and 
Nordea are the main market participants in the O/N-market. When reserves are unevenly 
distributed one or more of the panel banks may have to raise their contributions to signal 
liquidity constraints. Finally, the distribution variable also affects the fx-forward market. 
Again, the distribution variable is only significant in the subsample 1. When excess 
reserves are limited, the distribution of these reserves matter. This effect may be 
pronounced by the floor system and the market structure in Norway.  
Forecast errors are not significant for any of the dependent variables, except for 
NONIA. This result supports the hypothesis that a floor system simplifies the liquidity 
management by reducing the impact of forecast errors.38  
 
38 It is somewhat difficult to explain the NONIA result as the sign is opposite of what we expected a priori. 
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The forward bid/ask spread variable (sprd) is significant only for NIDR (Table 3b) and 
TN-NIBOR (Table 3c). The reason may once again be related to the fact that they are 
quoted, while the other variables are traded. The bid/ask spread may be seen as a 
volatility indicator. Quoted rates, where the banks commit to a volume at the quoted 
price, normally means higher bid/ask spreads and the interest rate increase. Actually 
trades may not be affected of this increase in volatility. The dummy variable for end of 
quarter effects is included to control for window dressing. Banks have to pay fees related 
to deposit guarantee. This fee is related to the size of the balance sheet and banks may 
want to trim down their balance sheets as much as possible. This effect is especially 
pronounced for NIDR (Table 3b) 
 
4.3 Rolling window regressions 
Figure 2 presents the t-statistics from a 100 day window rolling regressions using the 
OIS-basis as the dependent variable. This supplement the picture from the subsample 
results presented in Table 3e. First, as discussed above, the distribution variable is only 
significant pre-crisis. It is reasonable to believe that the effect of the distribution of 
reserves decrease when excess reserves increases. Like in the subsample results (Table 
3e) this is also confirmed by the rolling regressions. Furthermore, excess liquidity is not 
significant in a large part of the pre crisis period. Remember that the amount of excess 
liquidity has to be evaluated in relation to the demand. The results may indicate that the 
supply of reserves were plentiful relative to the demand in the pre crisis period. After 
Lehman, however, the demand curve shifted outwards, collateral constraints became a 
binding factor and banks hoarded reserves. This indicates that the amount of reserves was 
closer to the buckling point of the demand curve after Lehman. In contrast, structural 
liquidity were significant pre Lehman, but less so after. This reconfirms our subsample 
regressions and is related to uncertainty about the effect on individual banks outflow of 
reserves. This effect became less important when the banks were flooded with reserves 
after Lehman and the maturity of the loans from the central bank was extended.       
The rolling regressions for the forecast error variable support the view that this variable 
is not significant. The forward spread-variable varies across the sample, and this may be 
related to large variations in the risk-aversion. The USD-spread variable is negative and 
significant until the liquidity condition in USD improved substantially. The first 
Quantitative Easing (QE1) program contributed to considerable excess liquidity in USD. 
In 2011 the USD- premium (usd) again became significant as signs of dollar shortage 
appeared connected with the rise of the European debt crisis.  
 
4.4 Robustness  
Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide the results from robustness tests, all based on estimations 
using the OIS-basis. Table 4 (regression 2) indicates that the results are robust including 
the change in the liquidity variables and they do not alter the results. One may argue that 
the T/N-rate is influenced by the expected liquidity tomorrow rather than the liquidity 
today. However, by including one lead for the liquidity variables (table 4, regression 3), 
the results remain almost unaffected. Table 4 (regression 4) includes the lead variables for 
the liquidity measures but excludes the original liquidity variables. The lead variables 
then become significant but with a bit lower coefficient for excess liquidity.  
18 
 
Table 5 presents the result including excess liquidity in logarithmic form. This is to 
capture an eventual non-linear effect when excess liquidity increases way above its 
normal level. The results from Table 5 indicate that this does not improve the model. 
Excess liquidity is still negative and significant over the sample period. The subsample 
development is also similar to the base model.  
Table 6 present the results from table 3e replacing the OIS-basis with the first 
differences of the OIS-basis. Over the full sample period, only the end of quarter dummy 
is significant, indicating that my model explains the level rather than the changes in the 
forward market. The results change remarkable when the USD-spread is eliminated. This 
variable is a highly significant variable and should be included in the estimations.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the liquidity effect in Norway by analyzing the relationship 
between different measures of the short-term interest rate premium, the amount of 
reserves and several other variables that potential could affect the money market 
premiums. The models have been estimated on the period from the beginning of January 
2007 up to the end of September 2011 and also on subsamples covering the period prior 
to, under and after the financial crisis. The study provides additional insight in the 
division between the liquidity premium and the credit premium in USD. The liquidity 
premium is separated from the credit premium in a way, to my knowledge, not done in 
earlier literature. 
A new dependent variable is used to isolate the impact of central bank reserves on fx- 
forwards. By constructing a cross currency forward premium based on expected policy 
rates (OIS rates) and compare this to the actual fx-forward premium in the market I have 
isolated the effect of central bank reserves on fx-forward prices. By using this new 
dependent variable and the tomorrow-next variables in the regressions, I have separated 
the effect of a liquidity premium from that of a credit premium. Hence it is possible to say 
to what extent a USD-premium hit by Norwegian banks has been a liquidity premium 
faced by all banks or a credit premium faced by Norwegian banks only.  
For the whole period covering all subsamples, both structural and excess liquidity have 
a significant effect with the expected negative sign on almost all dependent variables. In 
the sub-sample prior to the crisis structural liquidity is the important liquidity factor 
driving the money market premiums. While structural liquidity has a significant effect 
with the expected sign in all of the models, excess liquidity has no significant effect in 
almost none of them. In the sub-sample covering the height of the crisis excess liquidity 
becomes more important than structural liquidity, though structural liquidity still has 
some explanatory power on the risk premiums.  
Moreover, when excess liquidity is at normal levels, the results indicate that the 
distribution of the liquidity is important. The analysis also shows contagion effects of the 
USD interbank premium on the Norwegian interbank premiums. However, during the 
financial crisis the liquidity premium was the main contributor to the increase in the USD 
premium. This is confirmed by my results which show that around 85 per cent of the 
premium increase in USD was eliminated through the fx-forward market during the 
height of the financial crisis.   
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Table 1a : Variables 
                          
Explanatory Variables A priori sign Explanation                      
Ex.liq  -  
Excess liquidity (reserves) in the banking system. Equal to the sum of 
each indivdual banks deposits in Norges Bank  
Str.liq  -  
The therotical sum of banks deposits before Norges Banks market 
operations.  
Err -  Norges Banks forecast errors. Actual outcome minus forecast. 
Dist + 
A measure of how equal distributed the reserves are. Higher value 
indicates less equal distribution of reserves. 
Sprd  +  
Bid/Ask spread in the forward market, measured by trades from Reuters 
Dealing 
Usd  - (+) 
A proxy for the risk premium in USD. Measured as a weigthed average 
between Kliemm  and Tullett Prebon T/N  rate minus Fed Funds target. 
Expected to be negative for the OIS-basis, and positive for the rest of the 
dependent variables. 
eoq Dummy + 
End of quarter dummy. Because of window dressing expected to be 
positive 
Dependent Variables                          
NONIA 
NONIA, O/N rate calculated by Norges Bank based on transactions from 
the settlement system.  
NIDR 
Offical Norwegian deposit rate (O/N-rate). Only three 
panel banks. 
NIBOR 
Tomorrow Next NIBOR quoted on Reuters. Six panel banks and 
quoted with large bid/ask spread 
Norges-Bank T/N 
Tomorrow Next rate calculated by Norges Bank with our own estimate of 
the USD rate and forwardpoints from Reuter Dealing 
OIS-basis   
Difference between theoretical forward points and actual forward 
points from Reuter dealing      
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Table 1b: Descriptive statistics 
Explanatory variables 
  
Excess 
Liqudiity 
Structural 
liquidity 
Forecast 
Errors 
Liquidity 
distribution Forward Spread 
USD 
spread 
 Mean 47485.19 -17109.56 -125.9738 0.283896 0.141362 0.18456 
 Median 42488.5 -15474 -92 0.270249 0.05 0.085 
 Maximum 129453 69358.13 16004 0.687214 9.4 6.5 
 Minimum 8985 -110215 -18417 0.061599 -7 -0.49 
 Std. Dev. 24477.27 34892.08 2967.29 0.11029 0.540662 0.503028 
 Skewness 0.935927 -0.183072 -0.239722 0.624744 6.10927 8.152779 
 Kurtosis 3.429748 2.606797 10.11831 3.050665 141.4705 85.72251 
 Jarque-Bera 169.3647 13.25479 2337.168 71.80384 887264.2 326416.3 
 Probability 0 0.001324 0 0 0 0 
 Sum 52328676 -18854735 -138823.1 312.8534 155.7806 203.385 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6.60E+11 1.34E+12 9.69E+09 13.39239 321.8396 278.594 
 Observations 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102 
Dependent variables 
  OIS-basis NIBOR T/N NIDR NONIA 
Norges Bank 
T/N 
 Mean -4.206105 0.358126 0.134881 0.114229 0.177404 
 Median 2.927969 0.32 0.1167 0.09399 0.162023 
 Maximum 98.8393 2.56 1.1 0.924077 1.854167 
 Minimum -659.4298 -0.75 0.0467 -0.036272 -1.196719 
 Std. Dev. 43.33792 0.242165 0.095732 0.092403 0.203564 
 Skewness -8.499528 3.899445 6.613199 3.171238 0.707496 
 Kurtosis 103.4747 28.66546 56.93601 18.93353 15.96691 
 Jarque-Bera 447815.4 31030.1 132998.8 12683.25 7337.412 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
 Sum -4353.318 370.66 139.6023 118.227 183.6133 
 Sum Sq.    
Dev. 1942033 60.63776 9.476114 8.828698 42.84734 
 
Observations 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Probability OIS-basis NIBOR NIDR NONIA 
Norges Bank 
T/N Ex.liq Str.liq Err Dist Sprd Usd 
OIS-basis 1 
-----  
NIBOR -0.237226 1 
0 -----  
NIDR -0.237008 0.370650 1 
0 0 -----  
NONIA -0.287258 0.725333 0.446069 1 
0 0 0 -----  
Norges 
Bank T/N 0.174038 0.509283 0.289120 0.534378 1 
0 0 0 0 -----  
Ex.liq -0.138013 -0.064944 -0.129215 -0.233940 -0.3232 1 
0 0.066 0.0001 0 0.00E+00 -----  
Str.liq 0.017671 -0.207096 -0.139918 -0.355476 -0.329629 0.242962 1 
0.535 0 0 0 0 0 -----  
Err -0.021456 0.025173 -0.045630 0.038788 0.000761 0.048335 -0.002050 1 
0.5176 0.6268 3.43E-01 0.2628 0.8856 0.1534 0.8567 -----  
Dist -0.101677 0.027346 0.019134 -0.005886 0.010641 0.362020 0.029404 0.036186 1 
0.0015 0.2348 0.4786 0.9721 0.5163 0 0.4202 0.2624 -----  
Sprd -0.428737 0.338840 0.218908 0.335148 0.107689 0.136175 -0.023291 0.041075 0.07061 1 
0 0 0 0 0.0002 0 0.457 0.1737 0.0367 -----  
Usd -0.772394 0.586202 0.411009 0.534322 0.319211 0.008515 -0.148371 -0.001055 0.12845 0.438515 1 
  0 0 0 0 0 0.9046 0 0.7536 0.0008 0 
----
-    
The sample period goes from 01.01.2007 - 30.09. 2011 with 1022 observations after adjustment. P-values in italics, of the null hypothesis 
of no correlation. 
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Table 3a: Results with NONIA as dependent variable    
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)    (4)    
Overnight-              Full Sample 
Sample period: 
1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
2/6/09-30/9/11   
rate (NONIA) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat    Coeff.  t‐stat    
Ex.liq -0.0741 -4.19 *** 0.0340 0.75 -0.1200 -3.22 ***  -0.0363 -2.23 ** 
Str.liq -0.0687 -5.49 *** -0.0867 -4.56 *** 0.0839 2.17 **  -0.0372 -4.91 *** 
Err 0.1870 2.86 ***  0.0132  0.11 0.6660 2.40 **  0.0224 0.78 
Dist 
Sprd 0.01926 1.75 *  0.00026 0.05 0.01880 1.37 -0.002065 -1.76 * 
Usd 0.09271 5.29 *** 0.0897 2.67 *** 0.08038 3.92 ***  0.142721 4.52 *** 
eoq Dummy 0.0528 2.50 ** 0.0549 1.28 0.07538 1.95 *  0.033571 1.57 
Dist-₁ 0.0168 0.60 0.05624 1.70 * -0.2162 -1.46 -0.003429 -0.17 
Adj R^2 0.44 0.36 0.44 0.36 
Num.Obs 1076 339 183 554 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.               
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Table 3b: Results with NIDR as dependent variable     
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Overnight-              Full Sample 
Sample period: 
        1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
2/6/09-30/9/11   
rate 
(NIDR) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq -0.0529 -6.34 *** -0.00328 -0.93 -0.0625 -2.54 ** -0.0461 -4.36 *** 
Str.liq -0.0220 -2.87 *** -0.0454 -4.03 *** 0.0164 0.64 0.00479 0.78 
Err 0.0352 0.52 -0.0864 -1.08 0.3030 1.93 * 0.0900 1.24 
Dist 
Sprd 0.01543 2.43 ** -0.0473 -1.20 0.0141 2.40 ** -0.00165 -0.28 
Usd 0.0649 
13.0
2 *** 0.06067 2.40 ** 0.06605 11.1 *** 0.05054 1.87 * 
eoq 
Dummy 0.56782 5.67 *** 0.32158 2.21 ** 0.541036 1.99 ** 0.75926 
 
7.01 *** 
Dist₁ 0.03004 1.54 0.06598 2.44 ** -0.048 -0.64 0.01902 0.78 
Adj R^2 0.65 0.42 0.68 0.84 
Num.Obs 1020 340 182 498 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Table 3c: Results with NIBOR T/N as dependent variable   
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
NIBOR 
Tomorrow-              Full Sample
Sample 
period: 
1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
2/6/09-30/9/11 
Next rate 
(NIBOR) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. 
t-
stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq      -0.0545  -1.05 -0.02905 
-
0.25 0.03588 0.29 -0.03551 -0.59 
Str.liq      -0.1131  -4.00 *** -0.08089 
-
2.24 ** -0.07917 -0.61 -0.08657 -3.26 *** 
Err       0.2791  1.23 -0.38253 
-
1.38 0.65516 0.54 0.229186 1.67 * 
Dist -0.028431 -0.34 0.14010 2.13 ** -0.9010 -1.86 * 0.01727 0.18 
Sprd 0.050746 2.08 ** 0.02011 0.24 0.056707 2.77 *** -0.0157 -1.70 * 
Usd       0.26013  7.00 *** 0.06877 1.06 0.25900 6.03 *** 0.1281    1.18 
eoq 
Dummy -0.0456 -0.89 0.08327 1.41 
-
0.242934 -1.11 -0.02246 -0.64 
Adj R^2 0.36 0.09 0.36 0.08 
Num.Obs 1097 346 186 565 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Table 3d: Results with T/N-Norges Bank as dependent variable 
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Tomorrow-              Full Sample 
Sample period: 
1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
2/6/09-30/9/11
Next rate 
(Norges Bank 
T/N) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq -0.24748 
-
5.85 
**
* -0.13104 
-
1.28 -0.32700 -3.41 
**
* -0.2063 -3.49 ** 
Str.liq -0.13803 
-
6.00 
**
* -0.14522 
-
3.79 
**
* -0.32100 -2.81 ** -0.0383 -1.24 
Err 0.14627 0.73 0.19693 0.74 0.54800 0.42 0.0646 0.56 
Dist 0.15459 2.50 ** 0.112985 1.39 0.274090 0.73 -0.0085 -0.16 
Sprd 0.01180 0.88 -0.052781 
-
0.38 0.027142 1.04 0.00765 1.12 
Usd 0.10627 2.37 ** 0.097637 1.12 0.068567 1.62 0.6074 4.55 
**
* 
eoq Dummy 0.13323 1.88 * 0.033016 0.31 0.719320 1.91 * 0.0296 0.93 
Adj R^2 0.27 0.15 0.26 0.29 
Num.Obs 1099 344 185 570 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Table 3e: Results with the OIS-basis as dependent variable    
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Tomorrow-  Full Sample 
Sample period: 
1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
2/6/09-30/9/11 
Next rate 
(OIS-basis) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq -0.24504 -4.56 *** -0.19843 -1.96 ** -0.4300 -2.49 ** 
-
0.20387 -3.53 *** 
Str.liq -0.11939 -4.45 *** -0.13999 -3.79 *** -0.2730 -1.72 * 
-
0.03609 -1.17 
Err -0.20070 -0.58 0.17292 0.70 -0.1978 -0.75 0.03729 0.30 
Dist 20.6857 2.86 *** 18.6330 2.31 ** 44.360 0.74 0.42289 0.07 
Sprd 7.7549 1.17 11.5885 1.17 11.789 1.31 0.84534 1.60 
Usd -0.83881 -9.15 *** -0.9219 -10.9 *** -0.8685 -7.91 *** 
-
0.37107 -2.85 *** 
eoq Dummy 13.1223 1.93 * 3.68323 0.36 65.439 1.76 * 3.81594 1.11 
Adj R^2 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.29 
Num.Obs 1102 346 186 570 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Table 4: Results with the OIS-basis as dependent variable (full-sample 
estimations)    
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Tomorrow-  Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
Next rate 
(OIS-basis) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. 
t-
stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq -0.25093 -4.68 *** -0.124 -1.01 
Str.liq -0.11683 -4.24 *** -0.164 -2.24 ** 
Err -0.238 -0.67 -0.23922 -0.68 -0.242 -0.69 -0.3950 -1.15 
Dist 14.3461 2.12 ** 20.5041 2.82 *** 20.560 2.83 ** 20.406 2.79 ** 
Sprd 7.5511 1.14 7.70786 1.17 7.7089 1.17 7.5912 1.15 
Usd -0.83652 -9.10 *** -0.83931 -9.13 *** -0.839 -9.13 *** -0.8386 -9.06 *** 
eoq 
Dummy 10.044 1.44 12.6871 1.83 * 12.680 1.82 * 11.0349 1.68 * 
ΔEx.liq 0.12532 1.05 
ΔStr.liq -0.04844 -0.64 
Ex.liq‐1 -0.127 -1.06 -0.2440 -4.71 *** 
Str.liq‐1 0.0468 0.62 -0.1080 -3.99 *** 
Ex.liq+1 -0.18500 -3.74 *** 
Str.liq+1 -0.13100 -7.78 *** 
Adj R^2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Num.Obs 1102 1102 1102 1102 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Table 5: Results with the ΔOIS-basis as dependent variable    
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Tomorrow-  Full sample 
Sample period: 
        1/1/07-1/8/08
Sample period: 
       2/8/08-1/6/09
Sample period: 
        2/6/09-30/9/11
Next rate 
(ΔOIS- 
basis) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq -0.09153 -1.62 0.05030 0.40 -0.56300 -1.75 * -0.00553 -0.25 
Str.liq -0.04708 -1.25 -0.06158 -1.83 * 0.04830 0.24 0.00916  0.87 
Err 0.55441 1.52 -0.22406 -0.50 3.30600 1.73 * -0.09990 -0.68 
Dist 14.5729 1.43 8.01455 0.81 44.94094 0.50 -1.03549 -0.41 
Sprd 0.55441 0.09 -31.510 -1.54 -3.141885 -0.29 0.62522 1.42 
Usd -0.26568 -1.45 -0.35285 -2.14 ** -36.20123 -1.51 0.00953 0.23 
eoq 
Dummy 34.3140 2.01 ** 36.2306 2.53 ** 173.1381 1.97 * 2.45990 0.57 
Adj R^2 0.09 0.22 0.16 -0.05 
Num.Obs 1024 311 175 538 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.            
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Table 6: Results with the OIS-basis as dependent variable    
Dependent 
variable:  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Tomorrow-  Full sample Full sample
Next rate 
(OIS-basis) Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Ex.liq 
(Log) (-10.2886) (-4.56) *** -0.21595 -1.81 * 
Str.liq -0.123870 -4.68 *** 0.06689 1.62 
Err -0.15898 -0.46 -0.05007 -0.14 
Dist 18.6879 2.56 ** -36.5922 -1.28 
Sprd 7.60349 1.15 -2.98224 -0.19 
Usd -0.83854 -9.10 *** 
eoq 
Dummy 13.7553 2.02 ** -9.54181 -0.79 
Adj R^2 0.67 0.02 
Num.Obs 1102 1102 
Ex.liq = Excess liquidity measured as available reserves for the banking system after market operations; Str.liq = Structural liquidity 
measured as available reserves before central bank market operations; Err = Forecast errors made by the central bank; Dist =  
distribution of reserves measured as the share of the bank with largest deposit in the central bank; Sprd = Bid/Ask spread in the  
forward market; Usd = spread between key policy rate and the T/N rate in US; eoq Dummy = Dummy for end of quarter effects 
The models have been estimated using Newy-West estimator using robust standard errors. The symbols *,** and *** 
 represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.           
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Chart 1 
Norges Bank’s key rate, the lending and the deposit rate, T/N calculated by 
Norges Bank and NOWA.39 Per cent. 1. January 2010-18. November 2011. Daily data. 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 The shaded area represents the period from 3 October 2011 to 18 November 2011. The new liquidity management framework 
was introduced 3 October 2011. This period is not included in the results reported in table 3 to table 6.   
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Chart 2 
OIS-basis: the difference between the forward premium and the OIS-
differential for NOK, SEK, GBP and EUR, all relative to USD.40 Basis points. 
3 month maturity. 10-days moving average, 1 January 2007 – 18 November 2011. Source: 
Reuters and Norges Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 The shaded area represents the period from 3 October 2011 to 18 November 2011. The new liquidity management framework 
was introduced 3 October 2011. This period is not included in the results reported in table 3 to table 7.   
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Chart 3  
Dependent and explanatory variables variables41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 The OIS-Basis is measured in basis points, NIBOR T/N, NIDR, NONIA and Norges Bank T/N is in per cent. Structural 
liquidity, Excess liquidity and Forecast errors are in 1000 NOK, but coefficients are scaled in the estimations such that they 
represent the effect of one billion changes in basis points. The forward spread is measured in forward points, the USD-spread in 
per cent and the Liquidity distribution in per cent.  
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Chart 4 
T-stats from rolling window regressions with the OIS-basis as dependent 
variable42 
 
 
 
42 Regressions based on 100 observations, rolling one step forward. Estimations are based on the regression model in table 3e (1). 
The first shaded area indicates the crisis and goes from 1.8.2008 until 1.6.2009. The second shaded area goes from 30.9.2011 to 
18.11.2011, in which Norges Bank has operated in their new liquidity management system. This data period is not included in 
tables. The horizontal lines indicate 5 per cent significance level. 
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Chart 5 
Coefficients from rolling window regressions with the OIS-basis as 
dependent variable43  
 
 
43 Regressions based on 100 observations, rolling one step forward. Estimations are based on the regression model in table 3e (1). 
The first shaded area indicates the crisis and goes from 1.8.2008 until 1.6.2009. The second shaded area goes from 30.9.2011 to 
18.11.2011, in which Norges Bank has operated in their new liquidity management system. This data period is not included in 
tables.  
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